More than million user accounts have been exposed thanks FriendFinder Networks being hacked. The breach included 20 years of historical customer data from six compromised databases: Adultfriendfinder. This, the ,, exposed records, is the biggest data breach in , according to LeakedSource. At the time, Friend Finder Networks vice president and senior counsel Diana Lynn Ballou told Ragan that the company was investigating reports of a security incident; if true, then affected customers would be notified. The Yahoo hack, which exposed million records, happened in even if the public did not learn the full extent of the breach until
Create an Account. Regional Trends in Payment Fraud. Join Discussion. Digital Forensics. Some of the claims were actually extortion attempts. FriendFinder was frisnd in by Andrew Conru. It could also be specific in nature, where the adversary has one target in mind. The top 12 most common passwords in the dataset included those with common number patterns. These employees have stated that the majority of customers do not notice the charges for many months. Motherboard reported hackers had claimed to have breached the firm's databases.
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This website is operated in the US by Various Inc. Interesting how similar that is, isn't it, that one you're paying an online service might as well be an online brothel datta the other is you're paying someone specifically or sometimes a brothel, depending on how you like to do it. According to Leaked Source, 15 million of the breached usernames and passwords appear fimder come from users who have deleted or intended to delete their accounts. Ashely Madison issued a statement stating that 2. FriendFinder has issued a somewhat public advisory about the data breach, but none of the impacted websites have been updated Cock enhacement reflect the notice. Other Sites: Alt. For now, FriendFinder Networks is urging all users to reset their passwords. Case The friend adult finder data. The breach included million Adult FriendFinder user accounts, including account data for 15 million accounts that had supposedly been "deleted". Well I tried Penis stud free get the site to deleted the profile but they need info that I have know way of knowing because I didn't make the Jesse russo and because of this I losed an amazing guy because he thinks I am a player because of someone uesing all my stuff.
Six databases from FriendFinder Networks Inc.
- Six databases from FriendFinder Networks Inc.
- Looking for sex?
- You would think after the Ashley Madison inciden t , where nearly 37 million cheating men and women had their data stolen, sites like Adult Friend Finder would up their cybersecurity.
A group that collects stolen data claims to have obtained million accounts belonging to FriendFinder Networks, the California-based company that runs thousands of adult-themed sites in what it described as a "thriving sex community. Troy Hunt, an Australian data breach expert who runs the Have I Been Pwned data breach notification site, says that at first glance some of the data appears legitimate, but it's still early to make a call.
If the data is accurate, it would mark one of the largest data breaches of the year behind Yahoo, which in October blamed state-sponsored hackers for compromising at least million accounts in late see Massive Yahoo Data Breach Shatters Records. It also would be the second one to affect FriendFinder Networks in as many years. In May it was revealed that 3. It could also be particularly worrisome because LeakedSource says the accounts date back 20 years, a time in the early commercial web when users were less worried about privacy issues.
The latest FriendFinder Networks' breach would only be rivaled in sensitivity by the breach of Avid Life Media's Ashley Madison extramarital dating site, which exposed 36 million accounts, including customers names, hashed passwords and partial credit card numbers see Ashley Madison Slammed by Regulators. CSOonline reported that someone had posted screenshots on Twitter showing a local file inclusion vulnerability in AdultFriendFinder. Those types of vulnerabilities allow an attacker to supply input to a web application, which in the worst scenario can allow code to run on the web server, according to a OWASP, The Open Web Application Security Project.
The person who found that flaw has gone by the nicknames 1x and Revolver on Twitter, which has suspended the accounts. CSOonline reported that the person posted a redacted image of a server and a database schema generated on Sept. In a statement supplied to ZDNet, FriendFinder Networks confirmed that it had received reports of potential security problems and undertook a review.
Some of the claims were actually extortion attempts. But the company fixed a code injection flaw that could have enabled access to source code, FriendFinder Networks told the publication.
It wasn't clear if the company was referring to the local file inclusion flaw. The sites breached would appear to include AdultFriendFinder. LeakedSource provided samples of data to journalists where those sites were mentioned. But the leaked data could encompass many more sites, as FriendFinder Networks runs as many as 40, websites, a LeakedSource representative says over instant messaging.
One large sample of data provided by LeakedSource at first seemed to not contain current registered users of AdultFriendFinder. But the file "seems to contain much more data than one single site," the LeakedSource representative says.
Many of the passwords were simply in plaintext, LeakedSource writes in a blog post. Others had been hashed, the process by which a plaintext password is processed by an algorithm to generate a cryptographic representation, which is safer to store. Still, those passwords were hashed using SHA-1, which is considered unsafe.
Today's computers can rapidly guess hashes that may match the real passwords. LeakedSource says it has cracked most of the SHA-1 hashes. It appears that FriendFinder Networks changed some of the plaintext passwords to all lower-case letters before hashing, which meant that LeakedSource was able to crack them faster. It also has a slight benefit, as LeakedSource writes that "the credentials will be slightly less useful for malicious hackers to abuse in the real world.
For a subscription fee, LeakedSource allows its customers to search through data sets it has collected. It is not allowing searches on this data, however. In May, LeakedSource removed million emails and passwords of LinkedIn users after receiving a cease-and-desist order from the company. Kirk is a veteran journalist who has reported from more than a dozen countries. Further back, he covered military affairs from Seoul, South Korea, and general assignment news for his hometown paper in Illinois.
From heightened risks to increased regulations, senior leaders at all levels are pressured to improve their organizations' risk management capabilities. But no one is showing them how - until now. Learn the fundamentals of developing a risk management program from the man who wrote the book on the topic: Ron Ross, computer scientist for the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
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After selling that site in , he launched FriendFinder. At the same time, attempts to open accounts with the leaked email address failed, as the address was already in the system. Check out the latest Insider stories here. Interested in meeting:. Suite , Campbell, CA. Your email address will not be published. Hamilton Ave.
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AdultFriendFinder data breach - what you need to know
Attackers stole data of over million accounts. The site is owned by Friend Finder Networks, Inc. Stolen data included email addresses, names, ages, locations, passwords, and other personal information. The breach was possible due to a local file include vulnerability in the website. ROR[RG] stated that they did not fear reprisal because they lived in Thailand and the authorities could be bribed.
The model prescribes for main features that are Adversary, Victim, Infrastructure, and Capability. Two meta-features are also included. A Social-Political meta-feature consists of the axis joining Adversary and Victim features. A Technology meta-feature includes the axis joining the Infrastructure and Capability axis. To conclude the analysis, a policy prescription will be developed by considering appropriate governance layers with the goal of mitigating attacks of this nature in the future.
Additional information about the attacker is slim and the information available is sourced from posts made by the adversary, so it should not be trusted. Taking the available information at face value, ROR[RG] is the adversary operator but the adversary customer is unclear. Multiple customers could be reasonably hypothesized. ROR[RG] themselves could be the customer with some other party taking role of operator.
It is also conceivable that there could be multiple customers. Due to the nature of the data, it would be valuable to use as intelligence, to embarrass, or to blackmail individuals and it could also be used for fraud as a list of mail addresses for spam. It is telling that the data dumps posted on the forum did not contain credit card data which would have likely been in the original breach. This suggests that there were multiple customers. Forum members could be a secondary customer for the data after other pieces were sold off.
It is unclear what the primary attack objective was because the data could be valuable in multiple ways. Though there is no public information available on the subject, it is likely that a skilled attacker would have chosen to use compromised computers as a mechanism to anonymize their requests. Compromised Type 2 infrastructure would be included in the list of attack victims. Victim personae include Friend Finder Networks, account holders who became the target of spam, account holders who had their privacy breached, and account holders who could hypothetically have been targeted individually.
It is likely that the attacker obfuscated their IP address by use of proxies, VPNs, TOR, or hacked endpoints though no information was available to verify this. A standard computer and internet connection would have sufficed for Type 1 infrastructure.
The adversary was likely able to make requests and have database tables printed to their screen. It is unclear where the vulnerability was on the web site and what specific mechanism was used to trigger the exploit. It is also unclear which tools the adversary used to discover the vulnerability. This data set has not only economic value; it also has major social significance.
Its social significance could take many forms. It could also be symbolic in nature, where the adversary disagrees morally with those who frequent the site, thereby justifying their actions. It could also be specific in nature, where the adversary has one target in mind. In the case that the intent was to target one user, the motivation itself could take on multiple forms. A political enemy could be a user on the site or someone with money who could be extorted.
There is also a significant chance that the adversary themselves had a deep social connection to the site; they could be seeking information on another user that is personally important to them.
All of these aspects are of significant value and each of them individually would be of sufficient value to motivate an attack. If the attack was primarily motivated by financial gain, then the social-political relationship between adversary and the victim would likely be of fleeting persistence. In this case this was likely a smash and grab attack where sticking around would have been of only marginal economic value.
A financial motivation also suggests that the victim was one of opportunity. Alternatively, if the attack was socially motivated, the persistence could have been more enduring, especially if the social target is specific in nature where the victim would be one of interest.
It is reasonable to speculate that Friend Finder Networks knows what this vulnerability was and which source IP addresses were involved in the attack. Knowledge of the specific vulnerability could be used to identify if other systems are vulnerable in the same way. An example of this would be if the vulnerability existed in a commonly used piece of software. Signatures like input string formatting could be used to associate this attack with others to identify a common adversary or to try to identify multiple attackers if multiple signatures are found.
IP address information could be correlated with other attacks to get a better picture of involved parties. Breach scope information could be important for reporting to regulatory authorities, for victim notification, for internal business decision making, and for future threat mitigation.
Since the attack does not seem to be related to or dependent on the country of origin a transnational would only mitigate one aspect of a subset of potential attackers. A transnational approach is not an appropriate governance layer to address this type of attack. National level policy should not be used to address this issue as it would not be agile and targeted enough to tackle the issues at hand.
However, the government can assist in fostering industry governance by initiating and incentivizing industry cooperation instead of direct regulation. Organizational policy might be effective if implemented because the organization best understands the technical implications and costs of mitigation. However, if solely left up to the organization, they could choose not to implement controls due to the financial burden or a cost-benefit analysis.
The industry governance layer is the most effective place to apply policy to combat breaches of this nature. The industry has the technical knowledge to understand and implement reasonable policy.
Also, the industry can be effective enforcing policy due to mutual interest and also competition. If one industry player is breached, users of other services might rethink their participation in similar services.
If one industry player is not doing enough, the others could name and shame them with a competitive spirit. This would indicate to the industry that the government is serious about the problem, and would also serve as an indication that the government could choose to regulate at a later date if the situation is not improved.
The industry cooperative should create a set of information protection guidelines that are both more stringent than what is currently implemented industry wide and which ninety percent compliance is reasonably attainable within a ten-year time span for most participants.
Those intimately familiar with the technical challenges will be able to participate in goal setting which will result in goals relevant to the technology stack and ones that are realistic. Franceschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo. Graham Cluley. Steve Ragan. Skip to content Menu. Caltagirone, Sergo, et al. The Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis. Next Federated Identity.
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